

| Name of organization                     | State | Amount |
|--|-------|--------|
| 8. Santa Clara University School of Law. | CA    | 69,000 |
| 9. Southern New Mexico Legal Services.   | NM    | 60,700 |

These one-time, one-year grants are awarded under the authority conferred on LSC by Section 1006(a)(1)(B) and 1006(a)(3) [(42 U.S.C. 2996e(a)(1)] of the Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974, as amended (LSC Act). This public notice is issued pursuant to Section 1007(f) of the LSC Act, with a request for comments and recommendations within a period of thirty (30) days from the date of publication of this notice. Grant awards will become effective and grant funds will be distributed upon the expiration of this 30-day public comment period.

Dated: July 18, 1995.

**Merceria L. Ludgood,**

*Director, Office of Program Services.*

[FR Doc. 95-18055 Filed 7-21-95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7050-01-P

## NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-160-OM; ASLBP No. 95-710-01-OM]

### Georgia Institute of Technology; Establishment of Atomic Safety and Licensing Board

Pursuant to delegation by the Commission dated December 29, 1972, published in the **Federal Register**, 37 FR 28710 (1972), and Sections 2.105, 2.700, 2.702, 2.714, 2.714a, 2.717 and 2.721 of the Commission's Regulations, all as amended, an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board is being established in the following proceeding.

Georgia Institute of Technology (Georgia Tech) Research Reactor, Atlanta, Georgia  
Facility Operating License No. R-97

This Board is being established pursuant to the request submitted by Glenn Carroll on behalf of Georgians Against Nuclear Energy (GANE) for a hearing regarding an Order issued by the Acting Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, dated June 16, 1995, entitled "Order Modifying Facility Operating License No. R-97 (60 FR 32516-18, June 22, 1995). The order adds and revises license conditions and technical specifications. Georgia Tech's license authorizes operation of the research reactor at steady state power levels up to 5 megawatts thermal. The research reactor is located in the Neely Nuclear Research Center in the north central portion of the Georgia Tech

campus in Atlanta, Georgia. An order designating the time and place of any hearing will be issued at a later date.

All correspondence, documents and other materials shall be filed in accordance with 10 CFR 2.701. The Board consists of the following Administrative Judges:

Charles Bechhoefer, Chairman, Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555

Dr. Jerry R. Kline, Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555

Dr. Peter S. Lam, Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555

Issued at Rockville, Maryland, this 18th day of July 1995.

**James P. Gleason,**

*Acting Chief Administrative Judge, Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel.*

[FR Doc. 95-18100 Filed 7-21-95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590-01-M

[Docket Nos. 50-266 and 50-301]

### Wisconsin Electric Power Co., (Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2); Exemption

#### I.

Wisconsin Electric Power Company (WEPCO, the licensee) is the holder of Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-24 and DPR-27 which authorize operation of Point Beach Nuclear Plant (PBNP), Unit Nos. 1 and 2. The units are pressurized water reactors (PWR) located in Manitowoc County, Wisconsin. The licenses provide, among other things, that the facilities are subject to all rules, regulations, and orders of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) now or hereafter in effect.

#### II

Section III.G.1 of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50 requires, in part, that fire protection features shall be provided for structures, systems, and components important to safe shutdown and that one train of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions be free of fire damage.

Section III.G.2 of Appendix R requires that (except as provided for in Section III.G.3), where cables or equipment (including associated nonsafety circuits that could prevent operation or cause maloperation due to hot shorts, open circuits, or shorts to ground) of redundant trains of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown

conditions are located within the same fire area outside of primary containment, certain specified means be provided to ensure that one of the redundant trains is free of fire damage.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12(a), the NRC may grant exemptions from the requirements of the regulations (1) which are authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to the public health and safety, and are consistent with the common defense and security; and (2) where special circumstances are present.

By letter dated August 5, 1994, as supplemented by letters dated September 9, 1994, October 31, 1994, and February 28, 1995, the licensee requested an exemption from Section III.G.2.b of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50, to the extent that it requires the separation of redundant trains of safe shutdown cables and equipment by a horizontal distance of more than 20 feet, with no intervening combustibles, in the auxiliary feedwater pump fire area. Intervening combustibles in the form of cable fill in three cable trays, added as part of the diesel generator addition project, are located within the separation space between redundant trains of cables and equipment required to achieve and maintain safe shutdown after a fire. In addition, the horizontal separation provided between redundant auxiliary feedwater pumps is only 14 feet.

The staff previously granted an exemption for intervening combustibles in this fire area in a Safety Evaluation dated July 3, 1985. This evaluation stated that the minimum separation between redundant trains was 26 feet with a maximum separation of 60 feet. However, this space contains cable trays installed horizontal and parallel to the trays containing redundant cables. Based on the wide separation of the redundant trains, the configuration and limited amount of intervening combustibles, and the installed automatic Halon suppression system, the staff concluded that it is unlikely that an exposure fire or electrically initiated fire of the sufficient magnitude to prevent safe shutdown could develop prior to actuation of the Halon system and the arrival of the fire brigade. The three new cable trays (GW01-03, GN 01-03, and GC01-02), installed as part of the diesel generator addition project, are routed perpendicular to the redundant trains and provide a continuous path of combustibles between the redundant trains of equipment and cabling. This new configuration is outside the scope of the exemption granted to the licensee on July 3, 1985.